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the materialist paradigm, at least with regard to the probJem of continu-
ity between the inorganic and the organic. Griffin might have strength-
ened his thesis by discussing and offering his reasons for rejecting the 
current work in theoretical biology. 
Second, for most of us the panexperimentalist solution is so radical 
that it is hard to imagine what kind of sentience is spread throughout 
the universe. For example, it is much easier to think of such conditions 
arising on Earth, but what about the sentience that forms the basis of the 
nuclear-fusion reactions of the sun, the magma of volcanic eruptions or 
the vast regions of empty space? In this connection, I doubt many will 
be persuaded by Griffin's insistence on the distinction between true 
individuals and aggregational composites of such individuals. 
Panpsychism (in its various forms) has always been an interesting 
hypothesis, if not somewhat exotic and fantastical. To many this will be 
its central weakness, namely, the plausibility factor and the obstacle that 
it is a theory more suited to romantic idealism rather than serious sci-
ence or philosophy. 
As a fellow traveller in this territory, these are some of the lingering 
doubts that have prevented me from embracing panpsychism with open 
arms. In my view, however, Griffin does an excellent job of demonstrat-
ing that the reigning physicalistic materialism and dualism are even 
more implausible than panpsychism. The materialist story just doesn't 
quite add up in the end. 
For the reader who is convinced that dualism is a dead-end solution 
to the debate or simply tired of the arid and colorless discussions of 
materialism, this work offers refreshing novelty. Griffin's book deserves 
serious attention in order to provide a much-needed perspective and 
balance to the mind-body debate. 
NOTES 
1. See especially, Chapter 3 "The Vindication of Panpsychism," The 
Vindication of Absolute Idealism (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 
1983). 
2. See John L. Casti's discussion of the different biological theories for 
how life aros~ from natural, physical processes. Chapter 2 U A Warm Little 
Pond," Paradigms Lost (New York: Avon Books, 1989). 
Arguing for Atheism: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion by Robin 
Le Poidevin. Routledge, 1996. Pp. xxvii, 159. 
ANDREW ESHLEMAN, University of Arkansas at Little Rock 
This book is primarily a text, but, as the title indicates, Le Poidevin also 
makes a case for atheism. After sketching the contents of the book, I will 
make some general comments about the author's argument for atheism 
and discuss his contention that Western religion can survive the rejec-
tion of those metaphysical beliefs traditionally associated with theism. I 
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believe Le Poidevin's treatment of the latter topic to be the best feature 
of the book. I will conclude with some comments on the merits of the 
book as a text. 
Arguing for Atheism is divided into three parts. In Part I (the contents 
of which comprise nearly half the book), Le Poidevin's case for atheism 
consists in a critique of the traditional arguments for the existence of 
God. The cosmological (both a temporal and modal version) and onto-
logical argument are criticized respectively in chapters 1 and 2. Le 
Poidevin argues in the next chapter that it makes no sense to seek a 
causal explanation of the existence of the universe, once one properly 
understands the notion of a causal explanation. In chapter 4 he argues 
against traditional and probabilistic forms of the teleological argument, 
and in the fifth chapter considers and then rejects the claim that an athe-
istic version of the teleological argument can be constructed in order to 
explain the natural laws. Part II consists of two moral arguments favor-
ing atheism. In chapter 6, Le Poidevin argues that the theist can escape 
the Euthyphro dilemma only at the cost of accepting an objectionable 
form of moral realism. Chapter 7 is devoted to showing that theistic 
responses to the problem of evil are unsatisfactory. The final portion of 
the book treats issues connected with a non-realist view of theistic reli-
gion. In chapter 8, Le Poidevin defends a non-realist version of theism 
deemed theological instrumentalism-the view that discourse about God 
can be viewed as a useful fiction. Chapter 9 is devoted to maintaining 
that nevertheless, the debate between traditional theists and atheists is a 
meaningful disagreement. In other words, "Does God exist?" is a gen-
uine question which must be settled before one entertains non-realist 
alternatives. Finally, Le Poidevin contends in chapter 9 that the rejection 
of traditional theism and its often attendant belief in life after death need 
not rob life of its value for the atheist. 
The reader will find most of the arguments in Parts I and II familiar 
and handled competently. To his credit, Le Poidevin achieves a fair 
degree of argumentative depth in Arguing for Atheism, despite the fact 
that the book is meant to function as an introduction to philosophy of 
religion. However, his case for atheism is weakened substantially by its 
lack of breadth in two important areas. Now it is true that it would be 
unreasonable to expect a comprehensive treatment of the theism! athe-
ism debate in a book of this nature (and Le Poidevin himself acknowl-
edges in the preface that his case for atheism is far from comprehensive), 
yet one's decisions about what to include or not include become all the 
more important when space is limited to a significant degree. 
The first of two notable absences in Le Poidevin's case for atheism is a 
failure to address the theist's appeal to religious experience, either as 
evidence upon which to base belief in the existence of God, or-as 
reformed thinkers have argued in recent years-as a means of directly 
justifying belief in God's existence. Though Le Poidevin's charitable 
treatment of the theist's position is often exemplary, the effect of this 
absence is to render the theist's position artificially weak. For like him-
self, most theists are skeptical about the success of the traditional argu-
ments for God's existence. The second gap in the case Le Poidevin 
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builds for atheism is the absence of a discussion of the evidential as 
opposed to the logical problem of evil. This is surprising since many 
today would hold that the former poses the greater challenge to tradi-
tional theism. Thus, while a failure to treat the theist's appeal to reli-
gious experience artificially weakens the case for theism, the second fail-
ure unnecessarily weakens the case for atheism. 1 
As I suggested at the opening of this review, I believe chapter 8 on theolog-
ical non-realism to be the best feature of this book. I have long thought that 
the exchange between theological realists and non-realists could be enhanced 
if the participants were to borrow some of the conceptual resources from 
related debates in other areas of philosophy (e.g., philosophy of language, 
philosophy of science and meta-ethics). Le Poidevin attempts to do just that, 
distinguishing two alternatives to theological realism based on analogous 
alternatives to scientific realism-the view that scientific theories about unob-
servables "are true or false by virtue of the way the world is, and indepen-
dently of the ways we have of knowing about, or observing the world 
(p.108)." The theological instrumentalist holds that "discourse about God is 
purely fictional (p. 111)." The point of such discourse is not to describe but to 
transform lives. The theological positivist, on the other hand, holds that dis-
course about God is descriptive but descriptive of moral or psychological 
truths, not truths about a transcendent being. As Le Poidevin points out by 
reference to the work of Don Cupitt, theological non-realists sometimes 
equivocate between these two conceptually distinct alternatives, thereby com-
pounding the difficulty in understanding and assessing such views. 
Le Poidevin's conceptual spadework could be fruitfully expanded by also 
distinguishing between those non-realist views which purport to be captur-
ing the gist of ordinary talk about God2 and those which incorporate an 
"error theory." According to the latter revisionary views, ordinary asser-
tions about God are false claims concerning a transcendent being which 
ought to be re-interpreted in a non-realist manner.3 This is, in fact, the sort of 
view Le Poidevin defends. In the remainder of chapter 8, he attempts to 
answer the difficult question of how if, as he maintains, theological discourse 
is regarded as fictional, it can continue to exert a powerful influence over our 
lives by engaging our emotions. As Le Poidevin points out, the problem is 
not solved simply by pointing out that persons are often emotionally moved 
by fictional stories; for in the case of religion, one must not only be moved 
emotionally, but also motivated to engage in religious practice. It is rare to 
find a theological non-realist who grants that there is a difficulty here, but I 
suspect that this is a central reason why theists find non-realist accounts 
implausible. 
Le Poidevin's response is to propose that when engaged in religious 
practice, the theological instrumentalist is engaged in a game of make-
believe. She pretends that there is a God who has acted decisively in his-
tory in order to bring about humanity'S salvation and to whom she directs 
her worship and prayers. In doing so, she allows herself to become emo-
tionally involved in the drama within which she has located herself. Here 
one might wonder if there is any significant difference between such play-
acting and the sort engaged in by players of the infamous Dungeons and 
Dragons. The difference, presumably, is in the point of the exercise. As Le 
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Poidevin states, "The immediate object of our emotions is the fictional 
God, but there is a wider object, and that is the collection of real individu-
als in our lives ... What remains when the game of make-believe is over, is 
an awareness of our responsibilities for ourselves and others, of the need 
to pursue spiritual goals, and so on (p. 119)." In other words, while God 
talk itself is not to be understood as veiled discourse of another kind, it is 
intended to direct us toward truths of another kind. One will presumably 
continue in one's religious practice insofar as one's exercise in make 
believe is successful in directing one to these truths. 
Le Poidevin's discussion of theological non-realism and development of 
an instrumentalist version of it both clarifies the non-realist alternative to tra-
ditional theism and enhances its plausibility. I conclude this portion of the 
review with two questions. First, how are we to understand references by Le 
Poidevin and other non-realists to "spiritual goals," as distinct from moral or 
psychological aspirations, once one's religion is purged of its metaphysical 
truth claims?4 Second, and perhaps relatedly, is there anything distinctive 
about religion's ability to direct us toward important truths, or could this be 
accomplished just as well by engaging oneself imaginatively with a selection 
of great works of literature? 
Finally, some comments about the suitability of this work as a text. I very 
much like the idea of using a philosophy of religion text like Le Poidevin's 
which argues both for atheism and for the possibility of a religious brand of 
atheism. Students who are theists will enjoy trying to find fault with the 
author's case for atheism, and atheistic students will be challenged by the 
possibility that the practice of religion may be worthwhile, even if God does 
not exist. The absence (discussed above) of any discussion of both religious 
experience and the evidential problem of evil would demand that the text be 
supplemented by materials on these issues. Also, the text focuses through-
out on a broadly Western form of theism, so those who believe that a philos-
ophy of religion text ought not focus strictly on Western forms of religion 
will need to look elsewhere (see e.g., Taliaferro's Contemporary Philosophy of 
Religion). The book's jacket suggests that it also would be suitable for use in a 
metaphysics course, yet I cannot imagine it being so used (outside parochial 
settings), given its preoccupation with issues surrounding theism. 
Le Poidevin's arguments are clearly articulated and would be accessible 
to those with little background in philosophy. In fact, Le Poidevin's ability 
to explain very difficult ideas and arguments concisely is exceptional. The 
author has chosen not to use reference notes but instead to cite the source of 
views discussed at the end of each chapter under the heading, "Further 
Reading." Though this made the text itself very readable, I found myself 
preferring that the citing of sources be kept distinct from suggestions for fur-
ther reading. There is a glossary of terms, modest bibliography, and an 
index at the conclusion of the book. 
NOTES 
1. Le Poidevin may have thought that a discussion of religious experi-
ence would fit uneasily with his aim in Parts I and II to assess arguments for 
and against the existence of God in relation to the claim that theism's 
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explanatory power is greater than that of atheism. But as John Hick has 
highlighted in his work, religious experience is itself something that both 
the religious believer and atheist must explain. Another possibility is that 
the author decided not to address both religious experience and the eviden-
tial problem because of his desire to produce a book suitable also for a meta-
physics course. (See my comments below on the book's suitability as a text.) 
2. See e.g., R. B. Braithwaite, "An Empiricist's View of the Nature of 
Religious Belief," in Christian Ethics and Moral Philosophy, ed. Ian T. Ramsey 
(London: SCM Press, 1966), pp. 53-73; and possibly D. Z. Phillips, The 
Concept of Prayer, (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1966). 
3. Such a view is parallel to the meta-ethical error theory of J. L. Mackie. 
See Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong. (New York: Penguin Books, 1977), p. 
35. 
4. I am not here assuming that the notion of a spiritual goal or truth 
need necessarilv be tied to belief in a transcendent God. However, it does 
seem plausible to me that a genuine distinction between what is spiritual vs. 
moral or psychological presupposes metaphysical claims of some kind. 
Anglo-American Postmodemity: Philosophical Perspectives on Science, Religion, 
and Ethics by Nancey Murphy. Westview Press, 1977. Pp. xxi, 228. 
MEROLD WESTPHAL, Fordham University 
According to tills brilliant book, "our Western conceptual scheme, at its most 
basic level, is in the process of change," change so "drastic" that the "radical 
discontinuity" between ourselves and our most recent predecessors is as 
great as that "between Descartes and his Jesuit teachers" (pp. 1-2). What 
makes the argument so bold and challenging is that Murphy locates this sea 
change, not in the French, poststructuralist philosophies of flux and trans-
gression but in an Anglo-American scene in which Austin, Quine, and Kuhn 
rather than Derrida, Foucault, and Lyotard represent philosophy's answer to 
the three tenors. 
More specifically, Murphy locates the change as occurring in epistemolo-
gy, philosophy of language, metaphysics; and, since the three themes or 
strategies being overthrown and replaced can well be taken as utterly basic 
to philosophical modernity, she appropriates the rubric 'postrnodernism' 
from the French as the most informative name for the intellectual revolution 
she explores. 
In epistemology, modernism is characterized by foundationalism. 
Murphy does not distinguish between 1) the weak foundationalism that 
merely claims that while some of our beliefs rest on other beliefs, other, basic 
beliefs do not and 2) the strong foundationalism that permits as properly 
basic only those beliefs which, by virtue of the certainty pertaining to them, 
can provide a fundamentum inconcussum for the edifice of knowledge. Most 
of the time when people talk about the collapse of foundationalism it is 
strong foundationalism that they have in mind; and many, if not most, of the 
arguments against the certainty claims of strong foundationalism take the 
form of attacks on the weak foundationalism it presupposes. Murphy's 
argument follows tills pattern. 
